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LET’S GO TO THE BEACH: GENDER SEGREGATION AS A 
TOOL TO ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
SARAH GIBBONS
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2016, at 10:30 AM every Wednesday morning, life-
guards at the Metropolitan Recreation Center in Brooklyn, New York blew 
their whistles and ordered all men out of the pool.1 The Metropolitan Rec-
reation Center, owned and operated by New York City, had a decades-old 
policy of only allowing female members to use the pool for one hour in-
crements, a few days a week.2 There was no such policy for male members. 
The City created these gender specific pool hours to accommodate Brook-
lyn’s large number of women who are Hasidic Jews and abide by strict 
codes of modesty.3 Although the regulation was enacted to accommodate 
women who practice Judaism, Muslim women, who also abide by strict 
modesty regulations, took advantage of the female only hours as well.4
Hasidic Jews follow a practice referred to as tzniut which means 
“modesty”; this belief encourages individuals to follow a code of moral 
conduct “related to humility.”5 Furthermore, this policy encourages follow-
ers to dress in a “sexually modest” manner and not attract undue attention 
both physically and in other aspects of life.6 Similarly, Muslim women are 
also encouraged to follow certain dress code restrictions. These dress codes 
can vary but all reflect the idea that women should dress modestly, particu-
larly around any man they could potentially marry.7
 1.  Sarah Malin Nir, Pool Rules: No Running, No Eating, and Three Times a Week, No Men,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/nyregion/pool-rules-no-running-no-
eating-or-drinking-no-men.html [https://perma.cc/8ELK-UCQR]. 
 2.  Id.
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id.
 5.  See Yosef Ahituv, Modesty and Sexuality in Halakhic Literature, JEWISH WOMEN: A
COMPREHENSIVE HISTORICAL ENCYC (March 9, 2009), https://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/modesty-
and-sexuality-in-halakhic-literature [https://perma.cc/U9VS-3YKD]. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Women in Islam and Muslim Realms: Dress Code, CORNELL U. LIBR. (March 7, 2019), 
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/IslamWomen/DressCode [https://perma.cc/6ND2-X6MV]. 
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Until the summer of 2016, there had been no complaints about the fe-
male only pool hours at Metropolitan Recreation Center. However, in 2016 
New York City’s Human Rights Commission received an anonymous 
complaint about the gender specific pool hours.8 After receiving the com-
plaint the Human Right’s Commission sent a notice to the City Parks De-
partment warning that the female only pool hours may violate laws that 
forbid gender discrimination in places of public accommodations.9 The 
complaint sparked public outrage and lead to the City Parks Department 
and the Human Rights Commission creating an agreement which granted 
the Recreation Center an exemption to New York City’s public accommo-
dations laws as long as they reduced their female only swim hours from six 
times per week to four.10 The Recreation Center’s practice of creating gen-
der segregated swimming hours is not unique, as there are several other 
cities who have used gender specific pool hours to accommodate people 
following strict modesty codes because of their religion.11
The Supreme Court has upheld various forms of gender segregation in 
public settings.12 However, the Supreme Court has not ruled explicitly on 
whether gender segregation policies used to accommodate religious minori-
ties in places like public pools and beaches are constitutional. This note 
will focus on the constitutionality of such policies through analyzing a 
proposed initiative by a New York City councilman, Chaim Deutsch. Spe-
cifically, this note will hold the initiative, which proposes to segregate a 
public beach by gender for two days during the summer, is constitutional.13
 8.  Malin Nir, supra note 1.  
 9.  Id.
 10.  Eli Rosenberg, Gender Segregated Swimming Cut Back at 2 Public Pools Near Brooklyn 
Hasidic Areas, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/nyregion/gender-
segregated-swimming-cut-back-at-2-public-pools-near-brooklyn-hasidic-areas.html 
[https://perma.cc/TZ36-4XDZ]. 
 11.  See Malin Nir, supra note 1 (a public pool in Toronto, Canada that has gender specific pool 
hours received praise for creating the opportunity for Muslim Women to swim); Rosenberg supra note 
10 (St. Johns Recreation Center in Crown Heights, Brooklyn implemented a two-hours-per-week swim 
period for females, and two-hours-a-week swim period for males. The Recreation Center had to elimi-
nate the male only block in order to receive the same exemption from the Human Rights Commission 
that the Metropolitan Recreation Center received).  
 12.  See Johnathan N. Reiter, California Single-Gender Academies Pilot Program: Separate but 
Really Equal, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (1999) (noting that the Supreme Court has not held single-
gender public schools are “per se unconstitutional”); Christopher H. Pyle, Women’s Colleges: Is Segre-
gation by Sex still Justifiable?, 77 B.U.L. REV. 209, 209-11 (1997) (this article shows how there are 
various single-gender universities); Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to Public Accommodations: 
The Debate over Single-Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97, 99-101 (2000) (various states have 
allowed single-sex health clubs).   
 13.  Carol Kuruvilla, New York To Have Special Gender-Segregated Days This Summer,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-york-councilman-
announces-gender-segregated-beach-days-for-jewish-muslim-
constituents_us_5b197371e4b09d7a3d701c92 [https://perma.cc/58QP-KWBT].  
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Councilman Deutsch represents a district in Brooklyn, where many of 
his constituents are Orthodox Jews and Muslims. To accommodate his 
constituents, Deutsch has rented a New York City owned beach, located in 
Brooklyn, for two days during the summer. The two days Deutsch plans to 
rent the public beach, which are June 29 and July 27, are days the beach is 
normally closed. Deutsch intends to open the beach with private funding on 
each day. Deutsch plans to open the beach exclusively to men on June 29 
and to women on July 27.14 The purpose behind Deutsch’s initiative is to 
provide a real beach experience to those who have never been because their 
religious modesty practices prevent them from attending co-ed beaches.15
There are several arguments both for and against Deutsch’s proposed 
initiative. Critics of the initiative argue the gender segregated beach days 
should be illegal because the policy violates both the separation between 
church and state and public accommodation laws.16 On the contrary, sup-
porters of the initiative argue the segregation is perfectly legal because it 
provides a reasonable accommodation for religious minorities and it creates 
an opportunity for certain people to swim and enjoy a beach from which 
they have been traditionally excluded from because of their religious be-
liefs. Supporters also argue the initiative provides a safe place for women 
who have a history of sexual harassment or abuse. 
The purpose of this note is to explain why Deutsch’s initiative should 
be passed because it does not violate the Constitution or any public ac-
commodation statute. The first issue this initiative raises is whether the 
beach is still considered a state actor when Deutsch opens it with private 
funds. Section I of this article finds the beach is still considered a state 
actor on the days it is opened by Councilman Deutsch because the beach is 
still operated and run in the exact same way the City operates the beach.17
The issue of a state actor segregating public areas by gender to ac-
commodate certain religions raises two major constitutional issues: (1) the 
government regulation at issue must not violate the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) the regulation must not violate the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. Section II finds the initiative 
constitutional under the equal protection clause because it is substantially 
related to an important government objective. Section III finds the initiative 
constitutional under the establishment clause because it serves a compelling 
government interest and history and tradition affirm that narrowly tailored 
 14.  Id.
 15.  Id.
 16.  See id.
 17.  See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).   
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accommodations that work to include individuals are legal under the estab-
lishment clause. Finally, Section IV finds the initiative does not violate 
public accommodation laws because it complies with the purpose of these 
statutes. 
I. THE BEACH IS STILL CONSIDERED A STATE ACTOR WHEN OPENED 
BY COUNCILMAN DEUTSCH ON JUNE 29 AND JULY 27
The initiative triggers the protections of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment because the beach still qualifies as a state actor on June 29 and 
July 27, the two days Councilman Deutsch plans to open the beach with 
private funding. Councilman Deutsch hopes using private donations and 
funds to open the beach on days it is normally closed will eliminate any 
constitutional issues arising from segregating what is normally a city 
owned and operated beach. Specifically, Councilman Deutsch wants to 
protect himself from violating the constitutional principle of  separation 
between church and state.18 However, there is a very strong likelihood that 
the beach will still be considered a state actor while under Deutsch’s con-
trol because the beach will still be operating in the exact same manner as 
when it is opened by the city. 
In determining whether a private entity is still considered a state actor, 
the Supreme Court has created the “state action doctrine.”19 The state ac-
tion doctrine stems from case law involving the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.20 A private entity becomes a state actor when 
“it carries out actions of the state either directly or indirectly through its 
relationship with that governing body.”21 The Supreme Court has created 
four tests to determine whether a private entity is considered a state actor, 
and these tests are often all used in conjunction with one another.22 These 
four tests are: (1) the public function test, (2) the state compulsion test, (3) 
the close nexus or symbiotic relationship test, and (4) the entwinement 
test.23 These tests serve more as a starting point, the determination of state 
action is done on a case-by-case basis looking to the totality of the facts 
 18.  Rich Calder & Nolan Hicks, Councilman Wants to Host Gender-Segregated Beach Days,
NEW YORK POST (June 6, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/06/06/councilman-wants-to-host-gender-
segregated-beach-days/ [https://perma.cc/ZR4A-TNES]. 
 19.  Bradley T. French, Charter Schools: Are For Profit Companies Contracting For State Actor 
Status?, Charter Schools, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 251, 261-62 (2006). 
 20.  Id.
 21.  Id.
 22.  Id. at 262. 
 23.  Id. at 263. 
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and circumstances and the decision of one test is not definitive in finding 
state action.24
A. The Public Function Test 
First, the public function test focuses on “the function being carried 
out by the actor in question.”25 Under this test, the question is more than 
whether the private entity is serving a “public function,” the question is 
whether the function performed is “traditionally the exclusive prerogative 
of the State.”26 The “exclusivity” requirement is a key factor in this test.27
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court found a privately operated school was 
not a government actor when it fired a counselor that was hired using fed-
eral grant money.28 The Court found the school’s action of educating mal-
adjusted high school students was a public function, but these services were 
not the “exclusive province of the state” because educating students who 
could not be educated in the public system was never a prerogative the state 
took on; the Court held just because a private entity serves the public does 
not automatically mean its actions are state action.29
Contrary to the decision in Kohn, opening the beach with private fund-
ing on days it is normally closed still allows the beach to operate a function 
that is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. Aside from the 
days Deutsch plans to open the beach, the beach is a state actor that is op-
erated and funded by the government. Therefore, even if opened with pri-
vate funding, the beach is still performing the same exact function it does 
when it is opened any other day of the year. This situation is significantly 
different from Kohn where the school was operating in a way that is not 
traditionally a government function because the educating of maladjusted 
high school students is not considered a traditional government function. 
Here, the use of a public beach, even if opened with private funding, is still 
performing the traditional public function the beach is intended for. 
Moreover, this initiative differs from other similar cases that have 
failed the public function test because of the fact the beach still serves its 
intended government function when opened by Councilman Deutsch.30
 24.  See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288, 303 
(2001).  
 25.  Id.
 26.  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 US 830, 842 (1982).  
 27.  French, supra note 19, at 263. 
 28.  Kohn, 457 U.S. at 832-34, 840-842. 
 29.  Id. at 842-43. 
30.  See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (the Court held providing utility 
services is not a traditional government function); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 US 149 (1978) (the 
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Notably, this situation is comparable to the facts of Marsh v. State of Ala-
bama, where the Court held a town owned and operated by a private corpo-
ration was still considered a state actor because the town operated the same 
as any other town, and the operation of a municipality is a function tradi-
tionally reserved for the government.31 The Court compared the town to 
other facilities that are “built and operated primarily to benefit the public 
and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to 
state regulation.”32 Comparably, the operation of a public beach is a munic-
ipality that is intended primarily to benefit the public, and even on the days 
Councilman Deutsch plans to open the beach with private funding, the 
beach is still serving members of the public. In conclusion, the beach pass-
es the public function test and is still considered a state actor even when 
opened by Councilman Deutsch. 
B. The State Compulsion Test 
Second, the state compulsion test, sometimes known as the nexus test, 
focuses on how much influence the government has over a private entity.33
This test hinges on whether the government body has “exercised coercive 
power . . . either overt or covert . . . over a private entity” to a degree that 
the decisions of the private entity should be attributed to the government.34
In Blum v. Yaretsky, respondents were a class of Medicaid patients 
who sued private nursing homes claiming the homes’ decisions to dis-
charge or transfer patients violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.35
The Court looked to whether the extensive state regulation of the private 
nursing homes was enough to make the decisions state action; the Court 
held mere regulation is not enough to prove state action.36 The Court stated 
the complaining party must show there is a close “nexus” between the 
regulated entity and the state, and a state can only be held responsible when 
“it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encour-
agement, either overt or covert” that the challenged action must be consid-
ered state action.37 Additionally, the mere approval of “initiatives of a 
Court held a private warehouse that stored and could sell the petitioner’s possessions after she was 
evicted was not considered a state actor because the settlement of disputes between creditors and debt-
ors is not a traditional exclusive government function).  
 31.  325 US 501, 507, 509 (1946).  
 32.  Id. at 506. 
 33.  French, supra note 19, at 264.  
 34.  Id. at 264. 
 35.  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 993 (1982).  
 36.  Id. at 1004. 
 37.  Id.
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private party” is not enough to hold the state responsible; “the required 
nexus may be present if the private entity has exercised powers that are 
‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of that State.’”38 The Court held the 
discharge and transfer decisions were not state action because these deci-
sions were made by “physicians and nursing home administrators” who 
were all private parties, and there was no evidence that suggested these 
decisions were influenced by the state’s obligation to regulate Medicaid.39
In regard to Councilman Deutsch’s initiative, there is likely no state 
compulsion here because the state is not forcing Deutsch to open and seg-
regate the beach by gender. However, the beach is owned and operated by 
the state, which would support a showing of a close nexus between the 
state and the days Deutsch opens the beach because Deutsch would be ex-
ercising powers traditionally reserved to the state. Yet, there is no evidence 
of state coercion here because Deutsch is merely opening the beach on days 
the beach is normally closed. Similar to the state in Blum, the decision to 
segregate the beach by gender is only that of a private actor, Councilman 
Deutsch, and is not the result of state regulation or influence. 
Importantly, this test is not definitive in finding state action, just be-
cause there is no state compulsion here does not mean the days Deutsch 
opens the beach is not considered state action. The overall facts of the situ-
ation support state action. As the Supreme Court stated in Brentwood 
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, no one fact or test 
result “can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding 
state action.”40 Here, when looking at the totality of the circumstances there 
is overwhelming evidence the beach is still performing a public function 
normally done by the state when opened by Deutsch and is therefore still 
considered a state actor. 
C. The Symbiotic Relationship Test 
Third, the symbiotic relationship test finds state action if the govern-
ment has created some sort of interdependence between the state actor and 
the private entity. Generally, there must be some sort of showing that the 
government is a joint participant in the challenged conduct.41 This test is 
the most subjective of all of the four tests and resembles a fact-specific, 
totality of the circumstances test.42
 38.  Id. at 1004-05 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).  
 39.  Id. at 1005. 
 40.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).  
 41.  See id. at 725.  
 42.  French, supra note 19, at 264-65. 
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In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the plaintiff sued a pri-
vately owned coffee shop for violating his constitutional rights under the 
equal protection clause after the shop refused to serve him because he was 
not white.43 The coffee shop rented space that was part of a government 
owned pubic parking lot, the rent from the shop helped the government 
finance the building and in return the shop got favorable lease terms and 
tax treatment; the Court found the shop’s discrimination amounted to state 
action because of the mutual benefits between the shop and the govern-
ment.44 Similar to the Court in Burton, in  Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc.,
the Court held cooperation between a private oil company and the state, 
where the oil company invoked state procedures to ensure the plaintiff did 
not dispose of their property before paying a debt to the oil company, con-
stituted joint action and the oil company was deemed a state actor.45
However, courts have been reluctant to find interdependence or joint 
action based on mere regulation by a state.46 In Lansing v. City of Memphis,
the court held mere cooperation between a private festival organizer and 
the city was not enough to rise to state action, even if the festival organizer 
was subject to state regulation and the city did receive economic benefits 
from the festival organizer.47 In Rendell- Baker v. Kohn, the Court found 
the fact the school received about ninety-percent of its funding from the 
government was not enough to make the school a state actor because the 
government did not have any role in management of the school.48
Here, there is interdependence between the government and the days 
Councilman Deutsch plans to open the beach. Similar to facts in Burton,
New York City will likely benefit in some way from the $400 dollar a day 
rental fee it takes to open the beach, and Deutsch will benefit by providing 
his constituents an opportunity to use the beach when they normally can-
not. Furthermore, Deutsch must adhere to the regulations and requirements 
set by the city on the days he opens the beach. The beach must operate in 
adherence with city regulations and serve the public in the same way it 
does on any other day the beach is open, and it is likely the same staff that 
works for the beach when opened by the city will also work when the 
beach is opened by Deutsch. Although the decision to segregate by gender 
is not necessarily one of state policy, the evidence that Deutsch cannot 
 43.  365 U.S. 715, 716 (1961). 
 44.  Id. at 719-720, 722-25.  
 45.  457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982).  
 46.  Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 832 (6th Cir. 2000).  
 47.  Id.
 48.  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982).   
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open the beach unless he follows city regulations, he pays the city, and he 
likely must use city workers all favors interdependence. The city and 
Deutsch must act together in order for the initiative to succeed. Therefore, 
there is a symbiotic relationship between the city and Deutsch’s beach 
days. 
D. The Entwinement Test 
Fourth, the entwinement test is the most recent test created by the Su-
preme Court.49 This test was developed in Brentwood Academy v. Tennes-
see Secondary School Athletic Ass’n and is arguably the most demanding of 
all of the four tests.50 For this test, when a private entity is “overborne by 
the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its 
composition and workings” then the government is substantially inter-
twined with the private entity and there is state action as long as holding 
the private entity to constitutional standards is fair.51 This test requires the 
court to analyze the composition of the private entity and determine who 
has the most involvement.52 Some courts have simply analyzed the en-
twinement test as part of the close nexus test.53
In Brentwood Academy, after a state athletic association sanctioned a 
high school for recruitment violations, the high school sued the state athlet-
ic association for violating its constitutional rights.54 The Court held the 
association, a private entity, was considered a state actor because of the 
“pervasive entwinement” of the public high schools and public officials in 
the association’s structure and daily work.55 The public schools made up 
eighty-four percent of the association’s membership, half of the board and 
council meetings were held during official school hours, the public schools 
provided financial assistance to the association, and members of the state’s 
board of education were also members of the association’s governing 
board.56 The Court also explained when there are prevailing facts that show 
entwinement between the government and a private entity to the point 
where it seems the identities of the two parties overlap, then the finding of 
state action is not negated by any facts that may not favor state action.57
 49.  French, supra note 19, at 265.  
 50.  Id. at 266.  
 51.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch.Athletic Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).  
 52.  French, supra note 19, at 266.   
 53.  Id.
 54.  Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 291. 
 55.  Id. at 291-92. 
 56.  Id.
 57.  Id. at 303. 
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Here, the city and Deutsch’s beach days will have overlapping identi-
ties. Deutsch must use the city’s facilities and resources when he opens the 
beach and the beach will be used in the exact same way as it would when 
opened by the city, except for the fact it will be segregated by gender. 
These prevailing facts show overlapping identities and entwinement be-
tween the two parties and this entwinement overrules any facts that do not 
favor a showing of state action. 
In conclusion, the public beach near Brooklyn is still considered a 
state actor on the two days Deutsch opens the beach. When opened by 
Deutsch the beach will still be used in accordance with its original public 
function, which is to provide the public a space to be outside and swim. 
The beach will be subject to the same rules, operations, and likely the same 
staff the city uses when opened by Deutsch, and the beach will appear to 
still be owned by the city when opened by Deutsch. Therefore, the beach 
should still be considered a state actor even when opened with private 
funds, thus the initiative must pass the constitutional muster of the equal 
protection clause and the establishment clause. 
II. COUNCILMAN DEUTSCH’S INITIATIVE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
One of the main criticisms by those who oppose Deutsch’s initiative is 
that it is never okay to segregate based on gender in a public place. The 
equal protection clause forbids the government to using any form of segre-
gation, including gender segregation, unless there is a compelling interest 
to do so. The equal protection clause is found in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and ensures no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protections of the law.”58 Courts use various levels of scrutiny 
when determining whether a state law or regulation violates the equal pro-
tection clause. These levels of scrutiny include: strict scrutiny, the highest 
standard of review; intermediate scrutiny, a medium standard of review; 
and rational basis review, the lowest standard of review.59 When evaluating 
whether Deutsch’s initiative violates the equal protection clause courts 
would use the intermediate scrutiny standard. 
However, courts have used strict scrutiny when evaluating cases in-
volving religious minorities and discrimination claims.60 Strict scrutiny is 
 58.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.  
 59.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).  
 60.  Michael J. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the Establishment Clause: Equal 
Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 95, 119 n. 134 (1996).  
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triggered when a government regulation or statute targets a suspect class or 
infringes on a fundamental right. 61 Race and national origin are two exam-
ples of a suspect class. 
There is an argument that religious minorities are considered a suspect 
class, and thus any law involving the oppression of a certain religion is 
subject to strict scrutiny.62 Nonetheless, the strict scrutiny standard does not 
apply here because this standard requires a challenged law to be facially or 
purposefully discriminatory.63 Under Deutsch’s initiative no religious mi-
nority is being discriminated against, in fact this initiative is working to 
include religious minorities. To pass strict scrutiny, a law must be neces-
sary, not merely rationally related, to the promotion of a compelling, not 
merely legitimate, government interest.64 In order to be necessary to the 
promotion of the compelling interest, the law must be narrowly tailored. 
Thus, even if an individual were to manage to bring a claim under 
strict scrutiny, the initiative would still be constitutional because it serves a 
compelling government interest of inclusion and is narrowly tailored to 
fulfilling this interest because the initiative only segregates the beach for a 
total of two days out of the entire summer. 
When assessing whether a government action or regulation resulting 
in gender segregation violates the equal protection clause, the Court uses a 
standard of intermediate scrutiny.65 The Court’s precedent of using some 
form of intermediate scrutiny when analyzing gender discrimination cases 
solidifies this is the standard that should be used to determine if Deutsch’s 
initiative violates the equal protection clause. 
Deutsch’s initiative passes the intermediate scrutiny standard because 
his plan is substantially related to his government purpose of creating 
equality for religious minorities. Before the 1970s, courts used the standard 
of rational basis review to determine whether facially discriminatory laws 
based on gender were constitutional.66 In 1971, the Supreme Court started 
to move towards a heightened level of scrutiny. In Reed v. Reed, the Court 
used a stricter form of rational basis review, referred to “rationality with 
bite,” to strike down a statue that automatically preferred males over fe-
61.  See Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 292 
(2015). 
 62.  Mannheimer, supra note 60, at 119.  
 63.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (when a statute creates racial classifications it 
triggers strict scrutiny review).  
 64.  Spece & Yokum, supra note 61, at 296.  
 65.  See id.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).  
 66.  See generally Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).  
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males when appointing an administrator of an estate.67 “Rationality with 
bite” is a term used when a court applies rational basis review, but looks to 
the actual, illegitimate,  purpose of the legislation or government action to 
determine if the purpose of the challenged action is to discriminate.68 In 
1976, in Craig v. Boren, the Court adopted an intermediate scrutiny level of 
review to find a law that facially discriminated based on gender was uncon-
stitutional.69
Under intermediate scrutiny review, the government must show the 
challenged regulation is “substantially related to the achievement of im-
portant governmental objectives.”70 In 1996, the Court tweaked this inter-
mediate scrutiny standard in United States v. Virginia declaring that state 
sanctioned gender discrimination can be upheld if it is “substantially relat-
ed to an important government purpose” and the government offers an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification.71 In Virginia, the 
Court held  the Virginia Military Institute, a very intense military school, 
violated the equal protection clause because it only allowed boys to attend 
the school and there was no government purpose of persuasive justification 
to support this segregation. Specifically, the Court found the institute’s 
justifications for excluding women, which were that a single-sex education 
contributes to “diversity in educational approaches” and provides important 
benefits to male students, were not persuasive justifications that would 
allow the segregation.72 The Court did state that if the institute had a sepa-
rate and equal school available only to women, then there would be no 
equal protection clause violation.73 Similar to the reasoning in Virginia, in  
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court used intermediate 
scrutiny to find a nursing school that only accepted women violated the 
equal protection clause.74
Following intermediate scrutiny review, Councilman Deutsch’s initia-
tive should be constitutional under the equal protection clause because the 
initiative is substantially related to the important government purpose of 
ensuring all members of the public have access to a beach, regardless of 
their religion. Evidence that religious minorities are traditionally excluded 
from enjoying the beach and that fact the initiative is so limited in terms of 
 67.  Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Boren, 429 U.S. at 198.  
 70.  Id. at 197. 
 71.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996).  
 72.  Id. at 515, 531, 535.  
 73.  Id. at 533. 
 74.  Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982). 
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when the gender segregation occurs satisfies the “exceedingly pervasive 
justification” requirement. Furthermore, as illustrated in Virginia, the Court 
has stated separate but equal in regard to gender discrimination can be con-
stitutional, as long as the separate entities are actually equal.75 Here, the 
exact same facilities with the exact same amenities and regulations will be 
used for both men and women on their respective days. Deutsch’s initiative 
passes a separate but equal standard because it differs significantly from the 
alternatives offered in Virginia and Hogan. In Virginia, the educational 
institutions available to men and women were not equal because the alter-
nate school available to women offered a significantly different curriculum, 
and in Hogan there was no alternate school open to men. On the contrary, 
under Deutsch’s initiative the exact same facility, amenities, and activities 
are given to both men and women. 
Additionally, in analyzing gender discrimination cases, the Supreme 
Court has found laws based on “overbroad generalizations,” meaning the 
regulation is based on a gender stereotype, unconstitutional under the in-
termediate scrutiny standard.76 However, the Court has allowed the gov-
ernment to take into account “real differences” between males and females 
when passing statutes.77 In Virginia and Hogan the Court found the reason 
for the gender segregation in each school was based on stereotypes that 
only certain genders are suited for certain professions, thus the segregation 
at each school was based on overbroad generalizations and therefore un-
constitutional.78
Here, unlike the generalizations used in Virginia and Hogan,
Deutsch’s initiative is simply adhering to the fact men and women have 
inherent biological differences. These inherent differences are integral to 
why certain religious groups feel they cannot dress a certain way in front of 
someone of the opposite sex; thus, Deutsch’s initiative is not based on gen-
der stereotypes.  Clearly, Deutsch’s initiative is based on real differences 
between men and women and his plan provides separate and equal facilities 
to both genders on their respective days. 
Most importantly, Deutsch’s initiative is substantially related to the 
important government purpose of protecting religious minorities and allow-
ing every member of the public to enjoy the beach and learn how to swim. 
Without Deutsch’s plan to segregate the beach, large portions of his con-
stituents would never get the chance to explore and swim at the beach be-
 75.  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.  
 76.  See id. at 533.   
 77.  See Michael M. v. Super. Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
 78.  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.  
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cause of their deep-rooted religious beliefs. The Constitution provides a 
strong argument that protection of religious minorities is an important gov-
ernment purpose. The protection of religious minorities is strongly rooted 
in our Constitution, as shown through the passage of the establishment 
clause, which arguably was passed as a way to protect religious minori-
ties.79 The equal protection clause and clauses protecting religion all have 
the same goal, which “is to safeguard minorities and outsiders with respect 
to religious beliefs,” and protect those who do not believe in religion; this 
goal fits perfectly with the “overriding goal of the Bill of Rights to protect 
vulnerable groups in American Society.”80
Scholars have recognized there is an equality principle to the estab-
lishment clause, arguing that equality is reflected in the idea of “non-
establishment” of any religion.81 This equality idea would also explain why 
there is a lack of case law regarding religious minorities and the equal pro-
tection clause because these equality issues are often decided under the 
establishment clause.82 A main goal of equality is “to open up previously 
exclusionary communities to those who have been excluded from them.”83
A remedy for exclusion is to “expand boundaries” or simply allow access 
to those who have been or are normally excluded from a certain communi-
ty.84 In this case, Muslim and Orthodox Jews are constantly excluded from 
enjoying the benefits of an outdoor co-ed beach based on their religious 
practices. 
This exclusion not only prevents these religious minorities from learn-
ing the fundamental life skill of swimming, but it also denies them the abil-
ity to enjoy a day outside by the beach, a luxury most people can take 
advantage of without any thought. Furthermore, an individual’s religion is 
often considered to be at the “core” of one’s self identity.85 For individuals 
who abide by strict modesty codes because of their religion, they do so 
because their religion is such an integral part of their life and being. 
Deutsch’s initiative will allow religious minorities who follow these strict 
modesty codes to enjoy an important activity without sacrificing their reli-
gious integrity. 
79. See generally Mannheimer, supra note 60, at 117 n. 126.
 80.  Id. at 122. (quoting Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Non-Believers, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 863, 868 (1986)). 
 81.  Id. n. 125  
 82.  Id. at 117-18.  
 83.  Id. at 117.  
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id.  
2020] GENDER SEGREGATION AND ACCOMODATING RELIGION 819 
Deutsch’s objective of allowing certain religious minority groups ac-
cess to a public beach is important because it ensures equality for minori-
ties as protected by the Constitution, and it allows a minority group access 
to a resource that majority of the population can use without any second 
thought. Previous case law has found public pools cannot deny access 
based on race, which solidifies that there is some sort of government inter-
est in ensuring everyone has an equal opportunity to use a public swim-
ming facility.86 Deutsch’s initiative passes intermediate scrutiny review 
because inclusion of religious minorities is an important government objec-
tive and segregating the beach based on gender is substantially related to 
this objective because it allows certain religious groups to feel comfortable 
and safe while using the beach. Additionally, the beach can be used equally 
by both men and women, and the initiative is not based on overbroad gen-
eralizations. 
In sum, Deutsch’s plan to segregate the beach by gender is constitu-
tional under the equal protection clause. Similar to the equal protection 
clause, this initiative is also constitutional under the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment. 
III. COUNCILMAN DEUTSCH’S INITIATIVE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Critics of Deutsch’s initiative also fear that the program violates the 
separation between church and state required by the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment.87 The establishment clause is the first clause of the 
First Amendment, which provides that “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion.”88 The establishment clause is incor-
porated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.89 Essentially, the 
establishment clause forbids a state or the federal government from passing 
a law that aids or favors one religion over another or forces a person to 
adopt a certain belief. Those who oppose Deutsch’s plan argue that through 
his initiative the government is endorsing minority religions and forcing 
strict modesty practices on the rest of the public. Majority of the case law 
today surrounding the establishment clause involve the relationship be-
tween religion and public schools, religious symbols in government build-
 86.  See Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F.Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Draper v. City of St. Louis, 
92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950).  
 87.  Rosenberg, supra note 10.  
 88.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 89.  David W. Cook, The Un-Established Establishment Clause: A Circumstantial Approach to 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 11. TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71, 77 (2004).  
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ings or property, or issues where the government provides religious sym-
bols.90
Most courts have read some sort of equality idea into the establish-
ment clause, so the analysis between the equal protection clause and the 
establishment clause is often considered one in the same.91 Therefore, we 
can expect Deutsch’s initiative to not violate the establishment clause be-
cause it does not violate the equal protection clause. Looking to the history 
and purpose behind both the equal protection clause and the establishment 
clause, both clauses were enacted to ensure some degree of “community 
participation,” meaning certain people or groups are not excluded from 
being part of a community.92 Under this rationale, it makes sense the Su-
preme Court has allowed both state and federal governments to “take action 
that appears to endorse or disapprove of religion” in situations where the 
government is working to ensure equality for a specific religious group.93
The Court has only allowed this type of government action when there is “a 
compelling reason for doing so and the action is narrowly tailored to effect 
[a] government interest.”94 This compelling interest standard strongly re-
sembles the strict scrutiny standard used in equal protection clause anal-
yses. 
In determining whether a government action violates the establish-
ment clause, the Supreme Court has used multiple tests over the years: (1) 
the Lemon test, (2) the endorsement test,  (3) a coercion test, and (4) an 
originalist and history and tradition test.95 For awhile, the Supreme Court 
relied on the Lemon test which found any government action that had a  
“primary purpose or effect” of promoting or favoring religion unconstitu-
tional.96 However, in County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., the Supreme Court, 
in a very divided decision, adopted the endorsement test when deciding 
whether a nativity scene located inside a county courthouse violated the 
establishment clause.97
Recently, in 2014, the Supreme Court moved away from the endorse-
ment test, which gained popularity after the County of Allegheny decision, 
 90.  See generally Cook, supra note 89, at 73.  
 91.  Mannheimer, supra note 60, at 121.  
 92.  Id. at 98, 132.  
 93.  Id. at 129 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Caroline Corbin, Opportunistic Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 54 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 617, 622 (2019).  
 96.  Id. at 622-23. 
 97.  BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION § 1:42 
(2019 ed.).  
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and adopted a history and tradition test to find a town’s opening of legisla-
tive meetings with prayer constitutional because the practice mirrored the 
tradition of the United States and the prayer did not compel the town’s 
citizens to engage in religious observance.98 However, not all courts have 
adopted this history and tradition test and some still follow the endorsement 
test, therefore this note will only use the endorsement and history and tradi-
tion test to find the proposed initiative does not violate the establishment 
clause.99
A. The Endorsement Test 
First, when using the endorsement test, courts look to “whether the 
challenged state action is intended to send a message to adherents that they 
are political insiders and to non-adherents that they are political outcasts (or 
vice versa), and whether the action has that effect.”100 This test essentially 
looks to whether the government is providing its support or endorsement, 
or disapproval, towards a certain religion; if the regulation is found to ei-
ther endorse or disapprove of a certain religion, the regulation is unconsti-
tutional. 
Determining the government’s intention in whether they are endorsing 
or disapproving of a certain religion is generally based upon subjective 
viewpoints and is determined by a two-step inquiry established by Justice 
O’Connor.101 The first inquiry is whether the actual purpose of the chal-
lenged regulation is to “treat some members of the relevant community as 
outsiders and others as insiders.”102 If the actual purpose is found not to 
treat members as outsiders or insiders, the second question is whether the 
state’s action has that effect anyway.103 Often, this test hinges on the sec-
ond inquiry, which proves to be more subjective than the first question, 
which is more objective.104
In Larson v. Valente, the Court used the compelling interest standard, 
which is closely tied to the endorsement test, to find a Minnesota statute 
that required specific reporting and registration requirements for religious 
organizations that solicited over fifty-percent of their funds from nonmem-
 98.  Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway et al., 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1919, 1825 (2014).  
 99.  See Blaesser & Weinstein, supra note 98, § 1:42 ft. 20.  
 100.  Mannheimer, supra note 60, at 129.
 101.  Id. at 131.  
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
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bers unconstitutional.105 The Court found the rule was not closely fitted to 
the state’s alleged compelling interest and used a version of the endorse-
ment test to come to this conclusion.106 Even though the regulation’s actual 
purpose was not to exclude, the Court reasoned that the state’s regulation 
could come across to the public as trying to favor certain religious groups 
as opposed to others by requiring reporting requirements for some religious 
organizations but not others.107
The Court used the endorsement standard established in Valente in 
Hernandez v. C.I.R.108 In Hernandez, the Court held a decision by the IRS 
to not deduct certain contributions made to a Church of Scientology did not 
violate the establishment clause because the deduction process implement-
ed by the IRS did not differentiate among various religions and was neutral 
in its purpose.109 The IRS policy did not enhance or inhibit any certain 
religion and the regulation did not threaten “excessive entanglement be-
tween church and state” because it did not delve into the religious doctrine 
of the various organizations that took part in the deduction regulation.110
The Second Circuit has also used the rationale in Valente to hold reli-
gious displays in a contract postal unit, which is a post office unit subordi-
nate to a main post office, located inside a church violated the 
establishment clause because the displays could indicate the U.S. Postal 
Office endorsed the religion, even though there was no actual purpose of 
favoring one religion over another.111
Deutsch’s test passes the compelling interest standard used by the en-
dorsement test. First, the initiative meets the compelling interest of ensur-
ing religious minorities who are normally excluded from using public 
beaches are included. This initiative is also narrowly tailored because it 
only segregates the beach two days out of the entire summer on days the 
public normally would not have access to the beach. The initiative satisfies 
the endorsement test because the state is not favoring or disfavoring one 
religion over the other. Here, the actual purpose of Deutsch’s initiative is to 
allow people access to a public facility who have been regularly excluded. 
This purpose is articulated through various interviews with Deutsch him-
self, where he states he simply wants to provide a way to include those who 
 105.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 251 (1982).  
 106.  Id. at 252. 
 107.  Id. at 253.  
 108.  Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989). 
 109.  Id. at 696-97.  
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Cooper v. U.S. Postal Service, 482 F. Supp. 2d 278, 298 (D.Conn. 2007).  
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are traditionally excluded.112 Therefore, this initiative does not have the 
effect of treating certain members of a community as insiders or outsiders. 
In fact, the initiative actually has quite the opposite impact. 
Unlike the government action in Valente, this initiative will not have 
the same impact as the government favoring one religion or organization 
over the other. Here, Deutsch’s initiative is simply working to allow access 
to a group of religious minorities who normally cannot go to the beach. In 
Valente, the regulation only allowed benefits to certain religious organiza-
tions but not others. Here, everyone is allowed access to the public beach 
except for one day out of the entire summer. Normally, the beach would be 
closed on the days Deutsch plans to open it, so technically Deutsch is al-
lowing members of the community one extra day to use the beach. The 
narrowness of this statue favors its non-exclusive effect because it only 
prevents access to the beach to one gender one day out of the entire sum-
mer. 
The benefit of allowing religious minorities access to this public fa-
cility outweighs any minor harm that may result from preventing one gen-
der from using the beach one day out of the entire summer. This initiative 
is also significantly different from the religious displays at issue in the Sec-
ond Circuit case because the government is not using any symbols or lan-
guage to favor one religious-group over another, Deutsch is simply trying 
including people in a place where they are normally excluded. 
This initiative is similar to the IRS regulation at issue in Hernandez.
The purpose of this regulation is neutral, and the initiative does not delve 
deeply into any religious doctrine. The purpose of this initiative is not to 
favor religious minorities as opposed to those who do not abide by strict 
modesty laws; the purpose is simply to include those who have been tradi-
tionally excluded. The initiative’s purpose here is quite clear that it is 
meant to include a group of religious minorities in a popular and life-saving 
activity, swimming at the beach.  Clearly, the initiative’s actual purpose 
here is not to treat members as outsiders or insiders but to include all mem-
bers in the enjoyment of the beach. 
Therefore, under Justice O’Connor’s two-step inquiry, the second 
question that must be answered is whether the initiative has the effect of 
excluding people anyway, even though the purpose of the initiative is in-
clusiveness. Here, Deutsch’s policy only excludes people of the opposite 
sex from using the beach for one day of the entire summer, on a day when 
the beach is normally closed to the public. This provides for such a minor 
 112.  Calder & Hicks, supra note 18.  
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exclusion of individuals of a certain sex that this exclusion cannot have the 
impact of creating insiders or outsiders, the policy is simply meant to in-
clude a group of religious minorities. As Justice O’Connor emphasizes in 
her concurring opinion in County of Allegheny, use of the endorsement test 
relies on looking to the specific and unique aspects of each situation to 
determine whether the government is acting in a way that endorses a reli-
gion.113 Here, Councilman Deutsch is not endorsing the religious minorities 
over any other religion or group, he is simply using his initiative as a spe-
cific way to remedy an issue of exclusion that takes place in his communi-
ty. 
The goal of the endorsement test is to determine whether government 
action sends a message to the public “that religion or a particular religious 
belief is favored or preferred.”114 This test satisfies the purpose of the es-
tablishment clause, which is to prevent the government from favoring one 
religion over another.115 Here, it is clear that government is not favoring 
one religion over another by adopting Deutsch’s initiative, it is simply 
working to include those who have been excluded due to their religious 
beliefs. In conclusion, Deutsch’s initiative does not violate the establish-
ment clause because his initiative passes satisfies the endorsement test by 
having an important and neutral purpose, and the implementation of his 
initiative is narrow. 
B. The History and Tradition Test 
Second, the history and tradition test requires all inquiries involving 
the establishment clause to be interpreted “by reference to historical prac-
tices and understandings.”116 Specifically, the test focuses on the principle 
that in all establishment clause cases, the court must “acknowledge a prac-
tice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scruti-
ny of time and political change” because eliminating such practices would 
lead to new religious divisions and controversies that the establishment 
clause was created to protect against.117 According to Town of Greece, NY 
v. Galloway et al., the key inquiry the court must look to under this test is 
 113.  Cty. of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (1989) (O’connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  
 114.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’connor, J., concurring in judgment) 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting 
in part).  
 117.  Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway et al., 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014). 
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whether the practice fits within the “tradition long followed by Congress 
and the state legislatures.”118
However, different from the question posed in Town of Greece, NY,
the inquiry here is whether state sanctioned segregation by gender to ac-
commodate minority religions violates the establishment clause. In order to 
answer this question under the history and tradition test, courts must look to 
whether state actions to accommodate religious minorities is a long-
followed tradition in the United States, similar to the tradition of opening 
prayer in Congress and state legislatures.119 Historically, the principle of 
protecting religious outsiders, such as those individuals who practice mar-
ginalized religions, has been a common thread for both decisions in free 
exercise and establishment clause decisions.120 While finding a universal 
original intent of the Founders regarding the meaning and purpose of the 
establishment clause can be difficult to pinpoint, the protection of minority 
religions can be interpreted as being at the core of the Founder’s purpose 
for drafting the establishment clause because our nation was founded on a 
“hodge-podge” of religious minorities that is still reflected in our country 
today.121
Further, the Founders of our nation are credited with creating a coun-
try that contrasted sharply from the European monarchy, and in creating 
this new nation the Founders drafted our Constitution based on a founda-
tion of principles that opposed the several unpopular principles in Eu-
rope.122 One principle that sharply contradicted one of the governing 
principles in Europe was the freedom of practicing religion, and the free-
dom to practice any religion one desires. Emphasized in the decision of 
County of Allegheny, the meaning of the establishment clause is “at the 
very least that government may not demonstrate a preference for one par-
ticular sect or creed (including a preference of Christianity over other reli-
gions).”123 Therefore, history proves the goal of the establishment clause is 
inclusion of all religions, not a domination of one religion, and Councilman 
Deutsch’s initiative complies with this purpose by including religious mi-
norities on a public activity that they are normally excluded from. 
 118.  Id.
 119.  Town of Greece, New York, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (the Court upheld a town’s practice of opening 
monthly board meetings with prayer because this practice has been followed by Congress and state 
legislatures for 200 years, since the founding of the United States).  
 120.  Jim Wedeking, Quaker State: Pennsylvania’s Guide to Reducing the Friction for Religious 
Outsiders Under the Establishment Clause, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 28, 30 (2006).  
 121.  Id. at 32, 34.  
 122.  Id. at 36.  
 123.  Cty. of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989). 
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As Justice Kagan affirms in her dissent in Town of Greece, NY, our 
Constitution makes a commitment to all Americans that regardless of an 
individual’s worship, every individual will count as a full and equal Ameri-
can citizen.124 Justice Kagan further emphasizes that “[a] Christian, Jew, a 
Muslim (and so forth)—each stands in the same relationship with her coun-
try, with her state and local communities, and with every level and body of 
government.”125  Justice Kagan dissented from the majority opinion in 
Town of Greece, NY because she felt the majority violated the constitution-
al idea that “our public institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu 
than to the Methodist or Episcopalian.”126
Specifically, Justice Kagan felt the facts of Town of Greece, NY dif-
fered from precedent decisions that upheld the practice of opening prayer 
before legislative meetings because the meetings in Town of Greece, NY
involved ordinary citizens and the town’s Board did nothing to recognize 
religious diversity.127 Even when picking clergy to open the town meetings, 
the Board never made any effort to “involve, accommodate, or in any way 
reach out to adherents of non-Christian religions.”128
Here, while the gender segregation will impact all citizens, the impact 
is very minimal and serves the greater purpose of including a religious 
minority group. Justice Kagan’s dissent and the history and founding prin-
ciples of our nation support the idea that religious inclusion is at the heart 
of the establishment clause and the initiative here is furthering this idea by 
including a religious minority group in a manner that does not force others 
to adopt these religious minority beliefs and is narrowly tailored as to not 
infringe on others rights. Therefore, this initiative satisfies the history and 
tradition test and does not violate the establishment because inclusion of 
religious minorities is a tradition that this nation was founded on and con-
tinues to practice. Finally, Deutsch’s regulation does not violate New York 
state’s public accommodation law. 
IV. COUNCILMAN DEUTSCH’S INITIATIVE DOES NOT VIOLATE NEW
YORK STATE’S PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW
Deutsch’s proposed initiative does not violate any public accommoda-
tion law because it adheres to the purpose of inclusion provided in the New 
York public accommodation statute. Federally, public accommodation law 
 124.  Town of Greece, New York, 134 S. Ct. at 1841 (KAGAN, J., dissenting in judgment).  
 125.  Id.
 126.  Id.
127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 1842. 
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only applies to restaurants and hotels, however similar to several other 
states, New York’s law specifically includes swimming pools as a place of 
public accommodation in its statute.129 Therefore, this note will only focus 
on the New York state public accommodation statute. 
Generally, the purpose of public accommodation laws is to ensure 
equal enjoyment of goods, services, and facilities presented by any place 
that offers public accommodation.130 A place of public accommodation 
violates public accommodation statutes when it discriminates against a 
certain individual or community.131  New York expressly lists “swimming 
pools” and any place where one seeks “health” or “recreation” as a place of 
public accommodation.132 Here, Deutsch’s initiative does not discriminate 
against a certain group to the point of violating New York’s public accom-
modation statute. 
The federal public accommodations provision can be found under Ti-
tle II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.133 The statute states all people shall 
be free from discrimination or segregation based on the grounds of “race, 
color, religion, or national origin” by any place of public accommoda-
tion.134 New York’s statute is very similar to the federal provision, except it 
is more specific in what constitutes discrimination and public accommoda-
tions.135 The New York statute finds it illegal for any place of public ac-
commodation to discriminate based on “race, creed, color, national origin, 
sexual orientation, military status, sex, or disability or marital status.”136
The idea behind government action to accommodate religion mirrors the 
anti-discriminatory purpose found in both the federal and New York stat-
utes. 
The general purpose behind religious accommodation is equality, a 
way to accommodate religious minorities who are often ignored or exclud-
ed because the government automatically adheres to the “majority” or “pre-
ferred” religions.137 Under this idea, the government is not endorsing or 
promoting one religion over another, but it is actually expanding religious 
 129.  42 U.S.C. § 2000 (a)(b) 
130.  Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS 
U. L. J. 631, 633 (2016). 
131. Id. 
 132.  N.Y. EXEC. LAW, ART. 15, STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, §292(9), https://dhr.ny.gov/law 
[https://perma.cc/NPL8-SN3X].
 133.  42 U.S.C. § 2000(a).   
 134.  Id.  
 135.  N.Y. EXEC. L. § 292(2a) (2015). 
 136.  Id. § 296. 
137.  Harvard Law Review, Accommodation of Religion in Public Institutions, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1639 (1987). 
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freedom by making it easier for religious minorities to take part in activities 
or events they would normally be prevented from based on their religious 
beliefs.138 Even some justices and legal scholars have used this “religious 
accommodations” idea to encourage activities like allowing the practice of 
religion in public schools to make students and schools more perspective of  
different religions and cultures.139
Here, Deutsch’s initiative does not violate New York public accom-
modation law because it is not working to discriminate against any certain 
group. In fact, the initiative creates social inclusion of religious minorities. 
The beach is open to the public the entire summer, with no gender segre-
gated days or restrictions, except for the two days Deutsch proposes. Obvi-
ously, it is a good thing the beach does not segregate based on gender, but 
these public beaches and pools show an automatic adherence to the “pre-
ferred” religions in the United States by not even considering some people 
may not be able to use co-ed beaches because it is deeply at odds with their 
faith. Deutsch’s initiative works to spark a conversation and open society to 
religious minorities by allowing these minorities to use the beach in a way 
that does not violate their religious virtues and allows them to feel comfort-
able. Even better, Deutsch’s proposal sparks this conversation in a way that 
does not infringe on the rights of those who either do not practice religion 
or practice a religion that does not have any modesty requirements. 
Those who are considered “outside” of these religious minority groups 
would, at most, only be excluded from using the beach one day out of the 
entire summer, and on a day the beach would otherwise be closed. This 
minor infringement on these “outsiders” rights does not outweigh the larger 
benefits that stem from the initiative, which include allowing access to 
those normally excluded from the beach and sparking a deeper conversa-
tion about acceptance. It is clear that Deutsch’s initiative should not violate 
New York public accommodation law because the purpose of Deutsch’s 
initiative is equality, not exclusion. Further, the use of single-sex health 
clubs throughout the United States shows that Deutsch’s initiative does not 
violate New York public accommodation law. 
A. SINGLE SEX HEALTH CLUBS PROVE DEUTSCH’S INITIATIVE DOES 
NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAWS
There have been several states that have found health clubs that only 
allow admission to a certain gender do not violate public accommodation 
138. Id. at 1642-43. 
 139.  Id. at 1643.
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laws, and the acceptance towards these gender specific clubs provide sup-
port for Deutsch’s initiative. In the late 1990s the Massachusetts Superior 
Court held a women’s only sex club violated the state’s public accommoda-
tions law.140 After this decision, there was a campaign  to encourage the 
Massachusetts legislature to change its law because an all-women’s health 
club had various benefits which included: providing safe place for those 
recovering from sexual abuse to exercise, to accommodate those who pre-
fer an all-women’s exercise space based on their religious beliefs, and to 
appease those who “simply [do] not want to be stared at by men.”141 In 
response to the Massachusetts court decision, the legislature passed a bill 
that allowed both male only and female only health clubs.142 In 1992, a 
Pennsylvania court upheld single sex health clubs by granting them a “pri-
vacy exemption” which exempted these clubs from complying with the 
state’s public accommodation law. 
As noted by the campaign in Massachusetts, single-sex health clubs 
have benefits beyond just accommodating those who are of certain reli-
gions. These benefits include: avoiding unwanted sexual advances or har-
assment from men that occurs at co-ed health clubs, and providing a safe 
space for women with a history of domestic or sexual abuse who may be 
deterred from exercising if their only options are co-ed gyms.143 If these 
single-sex health clubs violated public accommodations laws, then women 
could be deterred from exercising all together because there would be no 
gym where they feel comfortable. 
These benefits are easily transferable to the public beach at issue here. 
Beaches provide a place where friends and families can gather together and 
enjoy time outdoors and provide a place for people to learn the lifesaving 
skill of swimming. Women who have suffered any history of sexual har-
assment or abuse could be deterred from going to the beach for many rea-
sons, ranging from not wanting to feel exposed around men to wanting to 
avoid the “unwanted gaze” by men while they are trying to enjoy the out-
doors or learn how to swim. Beyond accommodating religious minorities, 
having one day during the summer where the public beach is only open for 
women could create an opportunity for women who normally feel uncom-
fortable going to the beach a chance to embrace all the benefits the beach 
has to offer. If Deutsch’s initiative violates any public accommodation law, 
 140.  Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to Public Accommodations: The Debate over Single-
Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97, 99 (2000).  
 141.  Id. at 99.  
 142.  Id. at 100.  
 143.  Id. at 132-33.  
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then certain women would never have the opportunity to enjoy the beach 
like other people can. Single-sex health clubs provide a great insight into 
why Deutsch’s initiative should be implemented and should not violate any 
public accommodations law. In conclusion, Councilman Deutsch’s initia-
tive does not violate New York state public accommodation laws because 
the purpose of his plan is equality, at a very low cost, and this purpose mir-
rors the purpose of the public accommodation statutes. 
B. Policy Justifications for Deutsch’s Initiative 
Similar to the justifications for single-sex health clubs, there are sev-
eral overwhelming policy rationales favoring Deutsch’s initiative. First, not 
only will this initiative benefit religious minorities, it will also provide a 
safe space for women to swim and enjoy the beach who have a history of 
domestic violence or sexual abuse. Second, there is evidence that in certain 
situations gender segregation seems to be somewhat more accepted than 
other types of segregation, like racial segregation. For example, clothing 
stores have floors that are separated by gender, and no one seems to be 
challenging the constitutionality of this segregation. However, there would 
likely be an uproar if stores began to segregate floors by race. Additionally, 
there are several examples of schools that are segregated by gender.144
As the Supreme Court mentioned in United States v. Virginia, separate 
does not necessarily mean inherently unequal when it comes to gender. 
Especially in situations where gender segregation could provide a safe en-
vironment for women in a place where they would normally feel uncom-
fortable or unsafe. Therefore, gender segregation can have benefits when 
used for the right reasons. Here, the segregation is so limited it will hardly 
impact members of the public who are against the idea of any sort of gen-
der segregation because the segregation is only for two days during the 
entire summer. The benefits of allowing religious minorities to use a facili-
ty they are normally excluded from and providing a safe environment for 
women certainly outweighs any cost of segregating the beach by gender for 
two days out of the entire year. 
CONCLUSION
Deutsch’s proposed initiative is constitutional because it does not vio-
late the equal protection clause or the establishment clause and it does not 
violate any public accommodation laws. Deutsch’s initiative will not only 
 144.  See Reiter, supra note 12.   
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spark a deeper conversation about accommodating and understanding reli-
gious minorities, but it will give those who have never been to the beach a 
chance to embrace and explore all the beach has to offer. Deutsch’s initia-
tive strikes the perfect balance of including religious minorities without 
infringing on the majority of individuals’ rights. Both this deeper under-
standing and inclusion of religious minorities far outweighs any minor 
harm that may stem from preventing people from using the beach one day 
out of the entire summer. 
